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What is the most obscure remark in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus?’ We 
have an embarras de choix, but TLP 5.5421 may well lay claim to this 
epithet. In this passage, Wittgenstein tells us which implications his 
analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions in TLP 5.542 has for 
our views on the ‘soul’ (‘mind’) or ‘subject’: 
5.542 I t  is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A thinks p’, 
‘A says p’ are of  the form ‘ “p” says p’: and this does not 
involve a correlation o f  a fact with an object, but rather 
the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their 
objects . 
5.5421 This shows too that the soul2 - the subject, etc. - as it is 
conceived in the superficial psychology of  the present day 
is a monstrosity. 
For a composite soul would no longer be a soul. 
At least four conflicting interpretations have been given of TLP 
5.5421 : 
(1) Some commentators claim that it shows that Wittgenstein 
regarded the mind as a complex entity: it is a Humean ‘bundle 
or  collection’ of  thought^.^ Perszyk calls this interpretation 
the ‘standard reading’ o f  the p a ~ s a g e . ~  
1. L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung: Kritische Edirion, ed. by 
B.F. McGuinness and J. Schulte. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1989. Henceforth 
referred to as ‘TLP’. 
2. Wittgenstein uses the word ‘Seele’. As S.A. Kripke notes in his Wilrgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982, 
pp. 49 and 127, ‘mind’ is often a better translation of this word than ‘soul’ because it 
has less religious and philosophical connotations. Since most readers of the English 
version of the Tractatus will be accustomed to the translation ‘soul’, we will use the 
latter term. 
3. For example, J. Hintikka, ‘On Wittgenstein’s “Solipsism”’, Mind 67 (1958). 88- 
91, and M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’, Ithaca, N.Y . ,  Cornell 
U.P., 1964, p. 301. 
4. K.J. Perszyk, ‘Tractatus 5.54-5.5422’. Philosophia 17 (1987), 111-126, quotation 
from p. 117. 
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(2) According to others, Wittgenstein precisely rejected this 
view: according to them, he wanted to say that the mind is 
(3) Some commentators want to have it both ways. For example, 
Hacker enigmatically writes: ‘The claim should be interpreted 
thus: the soul conceived of as a unitary simple subject does 
not exist. But conceived of as a manifold, it is the legitimate 
subject-matter of psychology’.‘ 
(4) Sluga, on the other hand, thinks that Wittgenstein wanted to 
show that the soul is neither complex nor simple. He credits 
him with ‘the discovery that the notion of the soul or subject 
is altogether incoherent and that, consequently, there cannot 
be any such thing’.’ 
Kripke keeps an open mind: ‘the obscure passage Tractatus 5.5421 
. . . does not appear to be directed primarily at Hume’s theory’.* 
Some commentators see no solution at all: Urmson speaks of 
‘almost impenetrable obscurity’.’ Others see no problem at all: ‘All 
this is commonplace and evident’, Rosenberg remarks after 
quoting the relevant passages. 
The great variety of existing interpretations suggests that the key 
to TLP 5.5421 has hitherto not been found. After having thought 
about the passage for many years, we believe that we have finally 
stumbled across a solution. We think that our interpretation is the 
first one which really does justice to the passage, in the sense of 
reconstructing it as a clear and cogent argument. Moreover, it has 
all other virtues any good interpretation of the passage should have: 
it is in accord with the textual evidence, it does not make 
implausible assumptions about Wittgenstein’s knowledge of ‘the 
psychology of the present day’, it does not treat the passage as just 
an isolated remark, and it suggests what the historical and 
systematical sources of his view may have been. Finally, our 
interpretation shows that the passage is more important than 
previous commentators have thought: it turns out to be closely 
5. G.E.M. Anscombe, A n  Introduction to Witgenstein’s Tracfatus, 4th ed., London, 
Hutchinson, 1971, p. 88. J. Hintikka and B. Wolniewicz, personal communications, 
1989. 
6. P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, 
p. 62. 
7. H. Sluga, ‘Subjectivity in the Tractatus’, Synthese 56 (1983), 123-139, 
quotation from pp. 129-130. 
8. Kripke, op. cit., p. 131. 
9. J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Oxford, Blackwell, 1956, p. 133. 
10. J. Rosenberg, ‘Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus’, Nois 2 (1969), 341-358, 
quotation from p. 342. 
326 Philosophical Investigations 
connected with the remarks on the perspectival character of the 
‘metaphysical subject’ in TLP 6.631 ff. 
All this does not imply, however, that our interpretation of TLP 
5.5421 is a just$cution of it. We think that it is an unfortunate 
remark, which is false (or misleading a t  best) and should never have 
made its way into the Tractatus. 
1. Thoughts 
As TLP 5.5421 is presented as a corollary of TLP 5.542 we have to 
understand the latter passage first. Fortunately, this is not too 
difficult. 
Wittgenstein begins by saying that ‘A thinks p’ is of the same 
form as ‘ “p” says p’. What is the form of ‘ “p” says p’? Well, it is an 
ascription of a fact to a sentence: it says that the sentence ‘p’ is a 
picture of the fact that p. If ‘A thinks p’ is to be similar to ‘ “p” says 
p’, it should also say that some sentence is a picture of the fact that 
p. It does so if we analyse it as saying that one of A’s thoughts is a 
picture of the fact that p. We know that Wittgenstein considered 
thoughts as similar to sentences; they consist of ‘psychical 
constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as 
words’.’’ So ‘A thinks p’ is in its analysed form indeed analogous to 
‘ “p” says p’: both involve the ascription of a fact to a sentence-like 
picture. 
After remarking that ‘A thinks p’ is of the same form as ‘ “p” says 
p’, Wittgenstein says that both sentences involve a ‘correlation of 
facts by means of the correlation of their objects’. This remark may 
be understood if we consider how a picture represents a fact. I t  is 
capable of doing so because it is a fact itselc it is the fact that certain 
pictorial elements are arranged in a certain way. Each pictorial 
element denotes a corresponding object. The fact that the pictorial 
elements are arranged in such-and-such a way says that another fact 
is the case, namely that the objects which correspond to the elements 
are arranged in the same way. So when a thought represents a fact, 
we have ‘a correlation of facts’ (namely the thought on the one 
hand, and the fact which is pictured by the thought on the other 
1 1 .  Letter to Russell dated 19.8.19, reprinted in L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Norebooks 
1914-1916, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd ed., Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1979, p. 131. 
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hand) ‘by means of a correlation of their objects’ (namely the 
‘psychical constituents’ of the thought on the one hand and the 
objects of the pictured fact on the other hand), which is precisely 
what TLP 5.542 asserts. 
It is important to notice that pictures (including thoughts) are 
always complex: the fact that certain elements are arranged in a 
certain way necessarily involves at least two elements. We may call 
the number of components of a fact its ‘logical complexity’ (TLP 
4.04). A picture and the fact which it represents have the same 
‘logical complexity’ (TLP 4.04), for there are no ‘multi-purpose’ 
pictorial elements denoting several objects or ‘empty’ pictorial 
elements which do not denote an object. This explains why a 
thought-ascription ‘does not involve a correlation of a fact with an 
object’: an object is simple and does not have the ‘logical 
complexity’ which is required to represent a fact. 
The above is hardly controversial. Dozens of commentators have 
offered similar anlyses in the past three decades. The only peculiar 
feature of our interpretation is that we want to read TLP 5.542 as a 
proposal for a semantical analysis of thought-ascriptions. One 
should not say that ‘A thinks p’ is equivalent to ‘one of A’s thoughts 
says p7. For if we did so, thought-ascriptions would become 
nonsensical. In the ideal language Wittgenstein had in mind, it 
cannot be expressed that a certain picture represents a certain fact; 
any attempt to do so would result in metalinguistic nonsense. 
‘ “p” says p’ is a good example of such nonsense: it tries to say what 
can only be shown. It is a correct expression in the ladder-language 
in which the Tractatus is written, but it cannot belong to the object- 
language. However, there seems to be no good reason to exclude 
thought-ascriptions from language. Therefore, ‘A thinks p’ should 
not be regarded as being equivalent to any sentence of the form ‘ “p” 
says p’, ‘thought T says p’ or suchlike. Rather, it says that one of A’s 
thoughts says that p; it is true iff one of A’s thoughts says that p. In 
this way thought-ascriptions remain ordinary sentences of language. 
An additional attractive feature of a semantical analysis is that it 
may easily be transformed into a truth-jiunctional analysis. l2 
12. G.J.C. Lokhorst, ‘Ontology, Semantics and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgen- 
stein’s Tractatus: a Formal Reconstruction’, Erkenntnis 29 (1988), 35-75, and ’Truth- 
functionality and Supervenience in the Tractatus’, in P. Weingartner and G. Schurz, 
eds., Reports of the 13th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Vienna, Holder- 
Pitchler-Tempsky, 1989, 276-278. 
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2. The empirical self 
How does the above account apply to TLP 5.5421? Let us begin by 
considering the first interpretation on the list presented above: the 
view that Wittgenstein considered the soul or subject as being 
identical with a Hurnean bundle or collection of thoughts. 
We may call such a bundle of thoughts the ‘empirical self’. This 
is the self which may be studied by psychology (TLP 5.641), and its 
identification with a bundle of thoughts explains why it may indeed 
be studied empirically. There even are two ways in which 
psychology may study the empirical self. First, thoughts are facts in 
the world. They may therefore be investigated in the same way as 
other facts in the world are studied. And secondly, thoughts may 
be studied by means of what they represent, that is, by way of their 
contents. The latter approach would presumably be the method of 
introspective (or at any rate ‘phenomenalistic’) psychology. 
There is no way to bridge the gap between the results of both 
methodologies. Psychology can never discover whether a given 
thought represents a given fact, for a thought can only show what it 
represents, and any sentence that says that this thought represents a 
certain fact can only be metalinguistic nonsense which does not 
belong to language. Psychophysical laws in the sense of sense- 
ascribing laws are as impossible to formulate as semantical laws are. 
3. The simplicity of the soul (subject) 
According to the adherents of the first standpoint on our list, the 
soul or subject which is mentioned in TLP 5.5421 is identical with 
the empirical self which we have defined above. However, there 
are at least two reasons why this interpretation cannot be correct. 
In the first place, Wittgenstein emphatically says that ‘a composite 
soul would no longer be a soul’. The empirical self, however, is 
complex. It is even doubly complex: it is complex because it is a 
bundle of several thoughts, and it is complex because each thought 
is complex in itself. Therefore the soul cannot be identical with the 
empirical self. 
There is only one way to counter this objection. One might 
maintain that Wittgenstein does not say that he himself regards the 
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soul as complex; he merely ascribes this view to the superficial 
psychologists of his time. Thus, TLP 5.5421 should be read as ‘A 
composite soul would no longer be a soul according to the superjicial 
psychologists of the present day’. However, this suggestion does too 
much violence to the text. The text certainly gives the impression 
that Wittgenstein proclaims the just-mentioned view as his own 
standpoint. 
In the second place, this interpretation charges Wittgenstein with 
having a caricatural view of the psychology of his time. There were 
almost no psychologists in his time who considered the soul, mind 
or subject as simple. The view that it is a bundle of thoughts was 
the most popular view in psychology around the turn of the 
century. We cannot give a full survey of the literature here, but 
only refer to Weininger’s Geschlecht und Charakcter, a book which 
Wittgenstein read and admired highly. Weininger heaped abuse on 
the psychologists of his time precisely because they regarded the 
soul as being nothing but a bundle of thoughts. He argued that this 
view is fine as far as women are concerned, but patently false when 
one takes male Caucasian geniuses into acco~n t . ’~  It is quite 
possible that Wittgenstein got his conception of the psychology of 
his time from Weininger; there are more traces of his influence. l4 
In sum, we seem to be obliged to accept the second interpretation 
on our list: the subject or soul is simple. Although it is simple, ‘the I 
is no object’ (Notebooks 7.8.16): for it ‘does not exist’ (TLP 5.631) 
and ‘does not belong to the world (TLP 5.632). We will return to a 
discussion of its nature below. 
The above interpretation is not only in accord with what the last 
sentence of TLP 5.5421 literally says, it is also in accord with the 
Schopenhauerian remarks in TLP 5.64 about the shrinking of the 
subject into a point without extension. 
4. How Wittgenstein changed his mind 
Wittgenstein radically changed his mind on the issue of the 
complexity of the subject between the time he dictated his notes to 
13. 0. Weininger, Ceschlecht und Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Unlersuchung, Vienna 
and Leipzig, Braumiiller, 1926, Part 11, Chaps. 6-9. 
14. See, e.g. Sluga, op.  r i t .  The remark in TLP 5.1362 that ‘“A knows that p is the 
case” is senseless when p is a tautology’ may also be an echo from Weininger. He 
wrote that a tautology does not express knowledge and cannot be the object of an act 
of thought. (Ibid., Part 11, Ch. 7). 
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Moore (1914) and the time he wrote the final version of the 
Tructutus (1918). The last sentence of the notes dictated to Moore 
says: ‘The relation of “I  believe p” to “p” can be compared to the 
relation of ‘ “p” says (besagt) p’ to p: it is just as impossible that I 
should be a simple as that “p” should be’.15 
Here Wittgenstein still adhered to the view that the subject is a 
complex entity similar to the empirical self we mentioned above. 
However, it is obvious that he says just the opposite in TLP 5.5421. 
He probably changed his mind as a result of reading Schopenhauer, 
who wrote in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung that the self is ‘an 
indivisible point’ which is the ‘centre of all existence’. (The 
influence of Schopenhauer is very conspicuous in the Notebooks.) 
Confusing TLP 5.5421 with the just-mentioned remark in the notes 
dictated to Moore is one of the main causes of the ‘standard’ 
misinterpretation of TLP 5.5421. 
5. The soul (subject) does not represent 
We have reached the conclusion that the soul or subject is simple. 
However, as we have already seen in our list of previous 
commentaries, Sluga claimed that the Tractarian soul cannot be 
simple. To quote him in full: 
He [i.e., Wittgenstein] raises a crucial difficulty for all those who 
argue that only a simple substance can have mental attributcs. If 
among those attributes is the ability to have representations and if 
representations of complexes are, by nature, themselves complex, 
we must ask how a simple substance is capable of having complex 
representations. 
But that suggestion, combined with the claim that a composite 
soul is not a soul any longer, seems to lead to the discovery that 
the notion of the subject is altogether incoherent and that, 
consequently, there cannot be any such thing. l6 
How do we reply to Sluga’s analysis? 
Sluga certainly draws attention to an important point. As he 
makes clear, Wittgenstein’s account of representation is, for 
example, obviously incompatible with Leibniz’s theory of simple 
monads which are ‘mirrors of the world’. According to the picture 
15. 
16. 
Notebooks, op. <it., p. 119. 
Sluga, op.  ( i t , ,  pp. 129-130. 
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theory there can be no simple monads which represent complex 
facts. The Many cannot be represented by the One. 
However, a similar critique does not apply to Wittgenstein’s own 
view of the soul as a simple entity. For he never says that the soul 
represents. Indeed, it is just the other way around: we want to 
suggest that TLP 5.5421 may most naturally be read as a 
straightforward rejection o j  the view that the soul represents. 
When we adopt this suggestion, the line of argument in TLP 
5.542-5.5421 suddenly becomes crystal-clear. Wittgenstein begins 
by noting that anything which represents a fact must be complex. 
From this he draws two conclusions. First, that Russell’s and 
Moore’s conception of the soul as an (indivisible) object is false. 
And secondly, that the conception of the psychologists of his time 
is wrong. For these regard the soul as something which represents 
(or as a collection of representations). But that implies that it is 
complex, and that is absurd, for ‘a composite soul would no longer 
be soul’. Therefore the psychologists are wrong in saying that the 
soul represents. 
This, then, is our new analysis of TLP 5.5421: it is a reductia ad 
absurdurn of the view that the soul or subject is a representational 
entity. The soul is no ‘mirror of nature’; rather, it is a windowless 
Leibnizian monad which differs from a true Leibnizian monad in 
that it does not represent anything. The soul may perhaps in some 
way be related to thoughts which represent facts (although it is not 
clear how we could conceive of such a relation), but it does not 
represent facts itself. 
Besides reconstructing TLP 5.5421 as a clear and cogent 
argument, our interpretation has at least two other advantages over 
the ‘standard’ interpretation. 
First, it does not imply that Wittgenstein had a superficial 
knowledge of the psychology of his times. It is undoubtedly 
correct to suppose that most psychologists thought that the mind 
has a representational character. Indeed, most psychologists still 
think so today. 
Secondly, our interpretation fits in very nicely with TLP 5.631. 
This passage may even be regarded as the clincher for our analysis, 
for here Wittgenstein unequivocally reaffirms the conclusion we 
have just ascribed to him: ‘There is no such thing as the thinking, 
representing subject’. Even if there were a subject, it could not 
think or represent, for then it would be complex. In the same 
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passage, Wittgenstein goes on to assert that ‘in an important way 
there is no subject’ at all. This statemcnt also supports our thesis 
that the Tractarian subject does not represent: for it would be hard 
to imagine how something that does not exist could represent 
anything. 
Thus, even if our suggestion may seem strange at first, there 
really is no way to avoid it! 
6. The idleness of the soul (subject) 
The soul or subject as it is portrayed by Wittgenstein is a pretty 
useless entity. It does not represent itself and cannot represent any 
other fact either. Nor does it play any role in the attribution of 
propositional attitudes: ‘A thinks that p’ is true iff some of the facts 
(thoughts) constituting the person A represent the fact that p. The 
soul does not come in anywhere. Moreover, the Humean argument 
in 5.631 ff. is designed to show that the soul cannot be represented 
by any other instance either. Thus, it seems to play no role in 
representation whatsoever. 
Some commentators deny this: they argue that the soul is the 
necessary precondition for representation. According to them, it is the 
instance which confers meanings on symbols. Pictures, thoughts 
and sentences would be senseless, lifeless facts in the world if the 
metaphysical subject did not provide pictorial elements with 
denotations. l7 
However, this suggestion is not tenable. In the first place, it is 
utterly incomprehensible. It is inconceivable how a metaphysical, 
non-wordly instance could ever imbue facts in the world with 
worldly meanings. It should at least partly ‘reach out’ to the facts 
(‘stick its fingers into the world’) in order to do this. Moreover, it 
cannot be simple if it is to do this. It should have some internal 
structure corresponding to the structures of the facts which it is 
relating to each other, for it would not be able to distinguish 
between different facts otherwise. 
In the second place, not the slightest evidence for the suggestion 
can be found in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein discusses only interpreted 
17. See, for example, A. Kenny, ‘Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy of Mind’, In 1. 
Block, ed., Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, 
140-147. 
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symbols. The interpretation is always considered as given before- 
hand. ‘The pictorial relation which turns a fact into a picture 
belongs to the picture itself.’ (TLP 2.1513) It is not necessary to 
invoke a soul as a deus ex machina which.has to give meanings to 
symbols, for symbols are meaningful from the very start. So ‘let’s 
not imagine the meaning as an occult connection the mind makes 
between a word and a thing’!18 
Similar objections apply to the suggestion that the soul is the 
instance which has thoughts. It is inconceivable how an extra- 
mundane entity can have facts in the world. Furthermore, there is 
no reason why some extramundane entity should have them. 
‘Thoughts think themselves’, in the sense that everything that goes 
on in thinking is completely accounted for by thoughts and what 
they represent. A soul could only be an inert homunculus, a 
bystander seeing nothing and doing nothing. 
So the hypothesis of the soul or subject seems to be completely 
superfluous. It does not have any useful property whatsoever 
beside its simplicity - if that may be called a useful property. With 
his assumption that the soul is simple, Wittgenstein puts it 
completely out of action. As William James said in his criticism of 
the doctrine of Transcendental Egoism: ‘The Ego is simply nothing: 
as ineffectual and windy an abortion as Philosophy can show’. l9 We 
might as well discard it - which is what Wittgenstein himself 
ultimately does in TLP 5.64ff. 
7. Why is the soul (subject) said to be simple? 
Why did Wittgenstein have such a strong conviction that the soul 
or subject is, if anything, simple? One superficial answer would be 
that he was misled by the surface-grammar of language. He 
thought that the pronoun ‘I’ is a name denoting a simple object, the 
I .  It is an indexical name, but no less genuinely name-like for that. 
A Humean argument shows that the denotation of this name is not 
in the world (TLP 5.631 ff.), and therefore it has to be outside of it, 
18. L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 73-74, in The Blue and Brown Books, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1958. 
19. W. James, The Principles OfPsycbology, Vol. 1, New York, Henry Holt, 1890, 
p. 365. Instead of ‘Ego’, James also uses the terms ‘Transcendental Subject’ and 
‘Self’. 
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or a t  least on the boundaries of it. And so he arrives at the strange 
doctrine of the soul as a chimerical, imaginary object. It has 
disappeared as an object from the world, but its ghost remains as 
the ‘gaseous’ or ‘aethereal’ denotation of the indexical ‘I’.20 
We think that this answer is too easy. Wittgenstein would not 
have forgotten his own lessons on the misleadingness of language 
so quickly. He will certainly have been sensitive to the possibility 
that ‘I’ may be no more a genuine name than ‘A’ in ‘A thinks p’ and 
that both names might have to be replaced by long descriptions of 
complex facts in a completely perspicuous language. After all, he 
showed such sensitivity in the notes dictated to Moore which we 
have quoted about (§ 4). He must have had deeper reasons for his 
opinion. 
We suggest that the answer may be found in the visual metaphor 
of TLP 5.633 ff. Nothing in the visual field suggests that it is seen 
by an eye. But its contents are such that we may introduce a 
fictitious ‘geometrical eye’ from whose standpoint it appears to be 
seen.*’ Such an eye does not really exist; it is a fiction similar to the 
‘point of sight’ (also called ‘central point’ or simply ‘eye’) which is 
used in the theory of perspective. 
There is a simple relationship between the geometrical eye and 
the boundaries of its visual field: the latter determine the former, 
but not conversely. The eye may be seen as the vertex of an 
imaginary three-dimensional cone containing the things which are 
seen in the visual field; the surface of this cone is the boundary of 
the visual field. The boundary of the visual field (including the 
geometrical eye) does not belong to the field itself; it is unseen and 
unseeable. It will be clear that each visual cone determines exactly 
one ‘point of sight’. However, the converse does not hold, for a 
cone starting from a vertex may fan out in various directions. 
The I (the subject) is a fiction similar to the geometrical eye. It is 
the imaginary standpoint (the ‘centre of the world’, Notebooks 
5.8.16) from which reality is experienced. ‘Experience as a whole is 
the field to which the philosophical I stands as does the geometrical 
eye to the visual field.’22 As in the case of the geometrical eye, the 




Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, 1982, 313-323, quotatlon from p. 317. 
The latter expressions come from the Blue Book, op. cit., p. 47. 
The expression ‘geometrical eye’ comes from the Blue Book, op .  ci t . ,  pp. 63-64. 
M.U.  Coyne, ‘Eye, “I”, and Mine: The Self of  Wtttgenstein’s Tractatus’, 
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‘boundaries’ of reality (although the converse does not hold): the I 
is the imaginary entity which precisely experiences this reality. This 
explains why TLP 5.64 says that ‘the I of solipsism shrinks to a 
point without extension and the reality with which it is correlated 
remains’. 
Just as the surface of the visual cone (including the geometrical 
eye) does not belong to the visual field which it encompasses, so the 
limits of reality (including the metaphysical I) do not belong to 
reality itself. This explains why TLP 5.632 says that ‘the subject 
does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world’. It 
would have been more accurate to say that the I does not belong to 
the world because it is an element of the limit of the world (namely, 
its ‘vertex’), but this seems only a minor lapse.23 
Now we want to suggest that the essential point which led 
Wittgenstein to his conception of the simplicity of the soul was his 
view that such virtual points of view are necessarily simple (point- 
like). Thus, he seems not to have thought of such expressions 
as ‘from the point of view (perspective) of the present Govern- 
ment . . .’, which involve collective viewpoints ascribed to collective 
entities. He seems to have thought that all perspectives are 
perspectives from one point.  It was this view which made him say in 
TLP 5.5421 that the I is point-like. (It is merely a virtual thing, but 
simple, if anything.) 
8. Further evidence for this interpretation 
The picture sketched above is clear and intuitively attractive. 
However, one might well ask for more arguments and textual 
evidence. We think that these are not difficult to give. 
First, there can be no doubt at all that Wittgenstein regarded the 
soul or subject as not really existing (virtual); we have already 
quoted the evidence in $3.  This also explains why it does not do 
anything ($ 6): it has a purely hypothetical nature. 
23. Coyne (op .  cit.) has no difficulty with TLP 5.632 because she regards the eye as 
the limit of the visual field and the I as the limit of reality. We say that the eye and I 
are only elements of these limits (namely, their vertices). We prefer our own 
interpretation because we do not see how one can make sense of Coyne’s talk about 
the ‘shapes’ of the visual field and reality if these shapes are assumed to be bounded 
by points. How could a point delimit a shape? 
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Secondly, the suggestion that Wittgenstein saw the metaphysical 
subject as the (fictitious) owner of experience becomes very 
plausible if we regard some of his later writings as reactions to his 
earlier view. In the Philosophical Remarks in particular, he argued 
that the perspectival structure of the experienced visual field does 
not provide one with reasons for postulating a subject as its owner. 
‘The visual space does not have an owner. . . The representation of 
visual space is the representation of an object and contains no 
suggestion of a O r  as Moore tells us: ‘He said that “Just 
as no eye is involved in seeing, so no Ego is involved in thinking or 
having toothache”, and he quoted, with apparent approval, 
Lichtenberg’s saying “Instead of ‘I think’ we ought to say ’It 
thinks”’ (“it” being used, as he said, as “Es” is used in “Es 
b l i t ~ e t ” ) . ’ ~ ~  Here he came close to the ‘psychology (philosophy) 
without a psyche’ of Hume and Lichtenberg, in which the I is just a 
‘grammatical fiction’. He was apparently no longer impressed by 
Weininger’s vehement critique of this view. 
Thirdly, the suggestion that Wittgenstein regarded the hypo- 
thetical centre of experience as simple because he did not think of 
perspectives from collective viewpoints, hardly needs textual 
evidence. The very word ‘viewpoint’ suggests that this is the most 
natural way of viewing perspectives. Moreover, similar virtual 
points occur regularly in the fields of descriptive geometry, 
projective geometry, geometrical optics, etc., which Wittgenstein 
must have studied as an engineer, and he may well have had them 
in mind. 
In view of the above three points, our interpretation seems to be 
backed quite well by textual and general considerations. 
In sum, we have come to the conclusion that TLP 5.5421 does 
not arise from a misunderstanding of language. Rather, it is the 
result of viewing one’s view of reality movegeometrico. The pronoun 
‘I’ refers to a geometrical fiction, the I, which is the virtual centre of 
all experience. Such a centre can only be point-like, never complex, 
and that is why it is said in TLP 5.5241 that a ‘composite soul 
would no longer be a soul’. 
24. L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. by R. Rhees, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1964, $71. 
25. G.E. Moore, ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33’, in his Philosophical Papers, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1959, 252-324, quotation from p. 309. Wittgenstein 
may have got the Lichtenberg quotation from Weininger, op. cit., part 11, ch. 7. 
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Thus, TLP 5.5421 expresses an opinion which is interesting in 
itself and is closely connected with the remarks on the metaphysical 
subject in the passages on solipsism. It is illuminated by them and 
illuminates them in turn. One might even say that these remarks 
can hardly be understood without taking TLP 5.5421 into account. 
TLP 5.5421 plays a more prominent role than previous com- 
mentators have usually thought. 
9. Why TLP 5.5421 should be rejected 
Nevertheless, it would have been better if TLP 5.5421 had never 
made its way into the Tractatus. 
In the first place, it mars the unity of the work. The soul or 
subject is totally different from the other entities that populate the 
treatise. Nowhere else do we encounter virtual entities virtually 
representing real facts. A consequence of this is that the doctrines of 
the Tractatus do no apply to it. The picture theory is a good 
example: it does not explain how virtual representation by point- 
like virtual entities might work. 
In the second place, the idea of a metaphysical soul or subject 
distinct from the empirical self is unfortunate in itself. As long as its 
purely fictitious character is stressed, the idea is innocent enough; 
but then why introduce it? In geometry and physics, virtual entities 
may often be very convenient. A good example in mechanics is 
offered by Hertz’s ‘invisible masses’ (which Wittgenstein referred 
to in the Notebooks, 6.12.14). These pseudo-objects (Scheingegen- 
stinde) enabled him to give a unified account of mechanics. But in 
philosophy of mind nothing much seems to be gained by 
introducing the pseudo-object of the metaphysical self.26 Moreover, 
postulating such an entity is a dangerous thing to do. Even if its 
purely hypothetical character is stressed, it is all too easily 
imaginable that someone might remark that his mind does not seem 
26. A similar critique applies to Dewan’s proposal to regard the mind as a virtual 
governor of the brain of the same type as the virtual governors which are defined 
over grids of electrical generators. The idea is useful in electrical engineering, but 
does not have any explanatory value in the philosophy of mind. See E.M. Dewan, 
‘Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System 
Theory’, in G.G. Globus, G. Maxwell and I. Savodnik, eds., Consciousness and the 
Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, New York, Plenum Press, 1976, 181- 
198. 
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imaginary to him. And thus it is all too easy to fall prey to 
illegitimate reifications of the same sort as Schopenhaucr’s reification 
of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. As long as the idea 
has no obvious value, it is best to avoid it. 
In the third place, the introduction of a soul or subject distinct 
from the empirical self is completely unnecessary within the 
framework of the Tractatus. Everything which Wittgenstein says 
about ‘my language’, ‘my world’, and the ‘truth of solipsism’ may 
just as well, nay, better be said without bringing a separate subject 
into play. We will devote the remaining part of this paper to a 
demonstration of how this may be done. 
10. The empirical self as the centre of existence 
Let us suppose that the pronoun ‘1’ does not refer to an imaginary 
point, but to a collection of facts; it is an indexical quasi-name of 
the collection of facts which constitute me. (It is not a genuine 
name because collections of facts cannot be named.) Thus, we 
return to Wittgenstein’s remark in the notes dictated to Moore that 
‘it is just as impossible that I should be a simple as that “p” should 
be’. Which consequences does this have? 
First, we may easily make sense of the remarks about ‘my 
language’ and ‘my world’ in TLP 5.6, as Hintikka pointed out a 
long time ago.” ‘My language’ is just another expression for my 
empirical self, the collection of thoughts I have or may have. 
(Remember that thoughts are similar to sentences.) Or alternatively, 
‘my language’ may be regarded as the collection of all sentences 
which express all the thoughts I may have. ‘My world’ is the 
collection of all (possible) facts which are represented by the 
thoughts I may have. At any given time, I may entertain any given 
subcollection of my collection of possible thoughts, which explains 
why ‘no portion of our experience is a prior? (TLP 5.634). But I 
cannot transgress the boundaries of what I may think (I cannot have 
a thought which I cannot have), and therefore ‘the limits of my 
language are the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.6).28 As my language is 
27. Compare Hintikka, op.  cit. (1958). 
28. ‘Ich kann mir nichts ausser meinem Denken denken; denn dadurch, dass ich es 
denke, wird es ja mein Denken, und fallt unter die unvermeidliche Gesetze 
desselben.’ (‘I can’t think anything which goes beyond my thinking; for the very fact 
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the language for me, ‘the only language which I understand’ (TLP 
5.62), my world is the world for me, the only world which I 
experience (TLP 5.641). 
Secondly, we may easily transpose the remarks we made above 
about the ‘perspectival’ character of the I to this new setting. The 
only difference is that the ‘viewpoint’ from which the world is 
experienced is no longer simple, but complex. It is a plane or region 
rather than a point. 
I t  is helpful to consider the case of the visual field again. It may be 
possible to define a point-like ’geometrical eye’ as the point from 
which the visual field is seen, although this should not be granted 
too quickly - how should one, for example, account for stereopsis, 
seeing in depth, if one limits oneself to one point-like geometrical 
eye? But even if it were possible to define such an abstract eye, it is 
more realistic to consider the two eyes taken together, which are 
both complex in themselves, as the standpoint (region) from which 
the visual field is seen. The visual field is seen from the collective 
perspective of a pair of eyes. Wittgenstein seems not to have 
thought of this possibility, which is, however, completely clear in 
itself. 
According to us, the case of the ‘I’, ‘soul’ or ‘self’ is analogous. 
These entities, too, may perhaps be defined as simple virtual points 
of perspective, but it is more realistic to regard them as collections 
of various real elements (thoughts), each of them complex in itself- 
that is, to identify them with the empirical self. We may grant that 
‘the I enters into philosophy because “the world is my world” ’, as 
Wittgenstein writes in TLP 5.641. However, that does not tell us 
anything about the nature of the I. In particular, it does not tell us 
that it is simple. The I may be as complex as the eyes jointly are. 
Thirdly, it is easy to do justice to the remarks about the non- 
encounterability of the self. The empirical self is a collection of 
facts, all of them belonging to the world. It is, in principle, possible 
that this self may encounter itself in the world, in the sense that it 
could contain a picture of every fact of which it is composed. It 
even does not have to be infinite to be capable of this feat, as Hacker 
wrongly supposes. 29 For we could envisage circles of representation in 
that I am thinking it turns it into my thinking, and makes it  fall under the inevitable 
laws of thinking.’) Wittgenstein? No, J.G. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 
Berlin, Voss, 1800, p. 157. 
29. Hacker, op.  cit., pp. 77-78. 
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the sense that a picture of a picture of a fact (or a picture to the n-th 
degree of a fact) might be identical with this fact itself. In this way, 
there could be a picture of every picture, while the total collection 
of pictures would yet remain finite. 
However, even if the empirical self contained a picture of every 
picture of which it consists, this would not guarantee that the 
empirical self is able to recognise the facts of which it is composed as 
being elements of itself. For as we saw above in our remarks about 
the impossibility of formulating psychophysical laws, it is impossible 
to represent, say or think what facts represent. Even if the self saw 
itself completely (for example, if it were identical with the brain 
and observed itself in action with the celebrated ‘autocerebroscope’), it 
would not be able to recognise itself as itself, because it could never 
see, say or think that the facts which it observes represent exactly 
the same facts which it is representing itself. Therefore the 
empirical self is in a sense ‘invisible’ or ‘unknowable’ to itself, even 
if it saw and knew itself completely. 
Fourthly, our account has the (minor) advantage over the view 
of the self as the purely imaginary centre of all experience that it 
does not exclude the possibility that two minds might have exactly 
the same contents. Two different collections of pictures might 
represent exactly the same facts, whereas minds which are 
completely determined by their experiences can only be different if 
they have at least one different experience. 
11. Living with the empirical self 
In short, all the things which Wittgenstein says about the 
metaphysical self may just as well be said about the empirical self. It 
seems wise to use Occam’s razor and excise the metaphysical self 
from the Tvactatur. 
This does not imply that everything which Wittgenstein says 
about the empirical self is unobjectionable. For example, the idea 
that thoughts are of a linguistic nature seems to be an unfortunate 
relapse to the mediaeval doctrine of a ‘language of thought’ or its 
short revival in German Idealism (Humboldt, Schelling, Hegel, 
Herder). Hege13’ boldly asserted that ‘we think in nouns’, and it is 
30. Quoted without reference by J .  Hadamard, T h e  Psychology oflnventron in the 
Mathematical Field, 2nd ed., Princeton, N.J., Princeton U.P., 1949, p. 68. 
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not unfair to suggest that Wittgenstein came rather close to this 
view, which was repudiated by almost all major philosophers who 
came before and after him.31 
Wittgenstein seems to have been led to it because he only had 
a representational theory of sentences. (His picture-theory of 
sentences might better be called a sentence-theory of pictures.) He 
derived this theory from Hertz’s theory of ‘dynamical models’; the 
only modification which he made was to give a linguistic 
(semantical) twist to it.32 With hindsight, this linguistic twist seems 
regrettable. Hertz’s notion of models (including his account of 
dynamical mental models) is still applicable to modern psychological 
models of mental representation such as the ‘Boltzmann machine’, 
while a theory of mental sentences is hopelessly out of date here.33 
But whatever the defects of the theory of the empirical self, these 
may be amended, for this notion seems to have a good deal of 
substance. With the metaphysical self it is different, and therefore 
we had better forget about TLP 5.5421 and the passages related to 
it. The simple metaphysical self is dead, but the complex empirical 
self is alive and well: l’bme est morte, vive l’bme. 
Dept  . of Philosophy, 
Erasmus University P .  0. Box 1738, 
3000 DR, Rotterdam, 
T h e  Netherlands. 
31. I am ignoring the philosophers which have proclaimed themselves to be the 
philosophers of modern cognitive science (Fodor, Pylyshyn and the like). First, 
cognitive scientists themselves are usually bewildered by the claims these 
philosophers make on their behalf, and secondly, this kind of philosophy is rapidly 
dying out anyway (cf. note 33). 
32. A good account of Hertz’s influence on the picture-theory may be found in J. 
Griffin, Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1964. 
33. The ‘Boltzmann machine’ is a device composed of simple elements analogous 
to neurons whose collective behaviour is described by the laws of statistical 
mechanics. It is able to make ‘dynamical internal models’ of the statistical structure 
of its environment which exactly conform to the definition H. Hertz gave of such 
models in his Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt, 
Leipzig, Barth, 1894. See, e.g., D.H. Ackley, G.E. Hinton and T.J. Sejnowski, 
‘A Learning Algorithm for Boltzmann machines’, Cognitive Science 9, 1985, 147- 
169, repr. in J .A .  Anderson and E. Rosenfeld (eds.), Neurocomputing: Foundations .f 
Research, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1988, 638-649. This anthology contains 
many more examples of non-sentential psychological models of a ‘Hertzian’ kind. 
